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Abstract 
Purpose 
The complexity of supplier-partner networks in the Information Technology (IT) sector 
where large suppliers utilize thousands of authorized partners, requires that organizations 
reconsider their approach to governing and managing the relationships involved. Traditional 
dyadic approaches to governance are likely to prove inadequate. This paper investigates the 
relationship between network governance mechanisms and relationship performance. 
Specifically, we examine the contingent effect of certification of partners and the use of partner 
communities (as formal and informal mechanisms of network governance, respectively), on 
complex and embedded networks of relationships. 
Design/methodology/approach 
A model examining the effect of formal and informal network governance on the 
relationship between embeddedness (structural and relational) and relationship performance is 
developed. Data was collected from a sample of partners of leading IT suppliers in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. Three-way interactions assess the contingent effect of certification and 
partner communities on the relationship between embeddedness and relational performance.  
Findings  
Results support the use of a combination of certification and partner communities to 
strengthen the link between network structure (structural embeddedness) and relational 
embeddedness, as well as relationship performance. Certification requires the sharing of 
explicit knowledge with partners whereas partner communities aid the creation and 
dissemination of more tacit, contextual knowledge. Furthermore, partner communities 
reinforce positive perceptions of fairness in suppliers’ network management practices, 
overcoming any perceptions of lock-in or coercive control that certification may suggest. 
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Practical implications 
Certification, despite all its procedural and reputational benefits, damages partner 
relationships and needs to be supported by partner communities, which themselves show 
particularly strong benefits in enhancing network relationships. 
Originality/value 
Despite the emerging prevalence of certification and partner communities in business-
to-business relationships, to date there is a paucity of research on their effects on partner 
relationships and performance. Organizations with an extensive network of similar partners 
may suffer network overload. This research shows that such organizations can manage their 
partner network more effectively through network governance mechanisms, thereby addressing 
the challenge of overload.  
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Introduction 
For large Information Technology (IT) suppliers, such as Microsoft, Cisco, IBM and 
Oracle, the creation of value depends largely on vertical networks and effective management 
of relationships with independent partners (de Ruyter et al., 2001; Gilliland, 2003). The vertical 
network consists of a lead supplier organization and numerous smaller partner organizations 
through which it sells and delivers IT hardware (e.g. computers, servers and network 
equipment) and/or software products. All major activities and key decisions are managed by 
the supplier; still its success in the market is heavily influenced by the efforts of its partners. 
For instance, two-thirds of the total revenue of SAP, one of the world’s largest inter-enterprise 
software suppliers, is driven by their worldwide channel partner network (Whiting, 2013), 
whilst Cisco, a leading supplier of networking and telecommunications hardware, derives over 
80% of its revenues through its 55,000 partners (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). Beyond their direct 
impact on revenues and margins, these channel partners are a critical source of market 
intelligence, co-creation and market development for suppliers (Sarker et al., 2012). However, 
despite the importance of these relationships there is a lack of research to help managers (Lee 
and Joshi, 2011). 
Despite their wide-spread popularity in the IT sector, organizations are increasingly 
dissatisfied with the return on investment from channel partner programs (Neumann et al., 
2015). Furthermore it is often suggested that more effective relationship management and 
engagement with these partners is needed to alleviate their mistrust in how suppliers engage 
and manage partners (Andrews, 2013). Evidence suggests that the scale and complexity of 
partner networks, in the IT sector, requires a governance approach that is more nuanced than 
the dyadic, control-based approaches traditionally adopted (Zarges, 2012). We assert that there 
is a clear managerial need to explore the impact of governance approaches that are focused on 
the management of the network, rather than multiple individual relationships.   
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We examine recent theorizing on relationship governance to address this need. The 
term governance refers to the processes that are needed to structure economic and social 
exchanges, and the control mechanisms used to maintain them (Heide, 1994). As such, 
governance has an important impact on the performance of inter-organizational relationships 
(Jap and Ganesan, 2000). Existing research on governance mechanisms in vertical channels 
has focused primarily on the management of individual relationships. However, it has been 
argued that this approach may not be effectively scalable, as relationships are typically 
embedded in more complex multi-stakeholder networks (Provan and Kenis, 2008; Zu and 
Kaynak, 2012). Partners in these networks can be managed more effectively through 
governance mechanisms aimed at enhancing the network as a whole thereby avoiding the 
challenges associated with trying to manage many partners individually (Dagnino et al., 2016).  
IT suppliers have recently advanced two contrasting mechanisms to collectively govern 
their large-scale partner networks: (1) the certification of partners; and, (2) the establishment 
of partner communities via online interactive forums. Certification, which is the standardized 
and formalized process of validating the authenticity of a partner’s resources and knowledge, 
legitimises partners relative to the network (Graffin and Ward, 2010). Partner communities are 
a form of network of practice where the social structure of the community and partners’ concern 
for reputation within the community serve to informally govern the network (Capaldo, 2014; 
Wasko and Faraj, 2005). 
While exploring both mechanisms, the context in which the relationship is embedded 
must be considered also as channel partners are embedded within a broader social network that 
will influence how they conduct and manage their cooperative relationships (Gnyawali and 
Madhavan, 2001). There are two main classifications of embeddedness - structural 
embeddedness and relational embeddedness (Kim, 2014). Broadly summarised, structural 
embeddedness focuses on who knows whom, whereas relational embeddedness captures how 
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well actors know each other (Moran, 2005). Specifically, structural embeddedness relates to 
the specific configuration of channel partners selected by the supplier and highlights the 
importance of framing partners as being embedded in larger networks rather than in isolation 
(Choi and Kim, 2008). Relational embeddedness refers to the closeness of bonds and shared 
goals between partners, and the expectation of reciprocity and relationship continuation (Carey 
et al., 2011; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). Currently, there is little agreement in the 
literature pertaining to the compatibility of formal and informal governance mechanisms, i.e., 
whether they operate more effectively as substitutes or complements, within the context of 
network embeddedness.  
The aim of this paper is to explore how certified partners in the IT sector are governed 
by their suppliers and the effect this has on their performance. We present a theoretical model 
that examines how the structural configuration of the partner network (the level of structural 
embeddedness) impacts relational performance, both directly and indirectly through relational 
embeddedness. Taking a plural form perspective on governance, we assert that partner 
certification and partner communities (formal and informal governance respectively), reinforce 
the impact of structural embeddedness on the strength of the relationship (relational 
embeddedness) between supplier and partner and subsequently on relationship performance. 
We contend that when certifications are combined with the informality of a partner community, 
they have a complementary effect. Although the certification process can foster negative 
sentiments when perceived as a form of coercive control, or monitoring of partners, it does 
generate explicit knowledge for the partners whereas a partner community provides more tacit 
contextual knowledge and reinforces the social norms which bind partners. Furthermore, 
partner communities reinforce positive perceptions of fairness in suppliers’ network 
management practices overcoming any perceptions of lock-in that certification may suggest.  
Frame of Reference 
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Governance of partner networks in the IT sector 
For large IT hardware and software suppliers the design and installation of complex 
solutions are typically led by value adding partners (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009; Lee and Joshi, 
2011). Most suppliers manage thousands of geographically dispersed small to medium sized 
partners (Gillilan, 2003). Cognizant of the importance of channel partners, suppliers are 
investing heavily in the management and maintenance of these strategic relationships. For 
instance, HP invested $1.5 billion in the launch of its PartnerOne program and recently IBM 
re-designed PartnerWorld University to educate their 155,000 partners in critical sales and 
technical skills. These partner programs are used to support specific partner segments, offer 
online training for professional advancement and certification tracks, and facilitate peer-to-peer 
knowledge and social exchange (Pelser et al., 2015). However organizations are increasingly 
dissatisfied with their returns from partner programs and require guidance in the management 
of these critical relationships (Lee and Joshi, 2011; Neumann et al., 2015). 
In IT supplier-partner networks suppliers face the daunting task of governing a network 
of tens of thousands of partners. Partnership governance mechanisms are the means by which 
a supplier attempts to align their partners’ practices with its goals (Heide, 1994). This can be 
achieved through either regulating the partners’ practices using formal governance mechanisms 
or influencing their behavior using more informal mechanisms. Existing theorized approaches 
to governance work at the level of the individual relationship and may not be scalable as the 
number of partners increase (Provan and Kenis, 2008). In addition, individualised contracts 
and the establishment of interpersonal contacts does not account for the partners as part of an 
ecosystem. As a result organizations with an extensive network of interconnected partners may 
suffer network overload, which can curtail the effectiveness and efficiency of the network 
(Dagnino et al., 2016). Rather IT suppliers can manage their partners more effectively through 
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specific governance mechanisms that aim to enhance the performance of both the individual 
partners and the network as a whole.  
Therefore IT suppliers have introduced two contrasting mechanisms to manage their 
networks - the certification of partners and the establishment of online partner communities. 
Despite the emerging prevalence of these two network governance mechanisms there is a 
paucity of research on their effects on partner relationships and relationship performance.  
Certification is the standardized and formalized process of validating the authenticity 
of the partner resources and skills (Modi and Mabert, 2007). Certification governance includes 
two fundamental elements - a codified set of standards and a certification system that allows 
organizations to communicate the attainment of these standards (King at al., 2005). To be 
“certified” in the IT sector, partners are required to have a number of pre-defined resources, a 
minimum acceptable level of technical knowledge and must undertake training in the products 
of the supplier (Gilliland, 2003; Palotie 2017; Wang and Philips, 2012).1 This is backed up by 
competence testing. Cisco’s experience is that training that is not validated with competence 
testing is not effective (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). Certifications are particularly effective at 
the network level as they allow suppliers to strengthen a large number of their partner’s 
capabilities efficiently (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009).  
Being certified signals to the marketplace that a certain level of competence has been 
reached in the supplier’s products, underlining the brand promise of the supplier (Kalyanam 
and Brar, 2009; Kirmani and Rao, 2000). Certification programs usually have tier levels 
representing partners’ capabilities. For example, SAS (a provider of analytics software) has 
silver, gold and platinum partners (SAS, 2017). Advancement form one tier to the next is 
determined by the number of employees who have passed SAS’s certification exams and the 
                                                 
1 This differs from the certification of quality management systems e.g. ISO 9001 which 
typically focuses on processes and are managed by third party organizations independent of 
the parties involved in the relationship. We thank the anonymous reviewer for this clarification. 
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taking of specific training courses. These partners can further differentiate themselves in the 
marketplace by obtaining specialization badges representing specific competencies  
IT suppliers provide online partner directories listing all certified partners and detailing 
their capabilities. This leads to positive reputational and legitimacy effects with end customers 
and other partners. Partners use certification information to identify other partners who share 
similar standards and with whom they may want to work with (Wang and Philips, 2012). 
Partners’ desire to acquire legitimacy sees certification act as a governance mechanism over 
the network (Capaldo 2014; Provan and Kenis, 2008). Achieving legitimacy in the market is 
the primary reason for partners to pursue certification (Lee and Joshi, 2011).  
To complement the certification process, and acknowledging that online communities 
can enhance B2B relationships (Andersen, 2005; Spralls et al., 2011), companies such as Intel, 
HP and Oracle have introduced online communities of practice. These partner communities 
play an important role due to the guidance offered, knowledge available, and technical support 
that partners can leverage (Bone et al., 2014; Graham and Hardaker, 2000). For example 
Microsoft Dynamics partner community has been set-up to allow partners to interact with each 
other; to post and answer questions; to get help from experts; and, to access useful videos and 
‘how-to’ articles (Microsoft, 2017). Partners are encouraged to post regular support and how-
to blogs on the community forum. Blog articles are seen as an effective way to help answer 
questions, give tips, provide advice and highlight the expertise of community members. 
These communities have now become the main repository for information regarding a 
supplier’s products, along with demonstrations and relevant training. The online message 
boards and chat rooms of the communities help to establish flows of information and facilitate 
on-going communication (Wuyts and Geyskens, 2005). Partner communities bring individuals, 
who have commonalities around a shared practice, together to exchange knowledge and 
expertise in order to improve and generate economies of expertise, whilst also collectively 
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generating solutions to shared problems (Spralls et al., 2011; Wasko and Faraj, 2000). Suppliers 
often encourage the development of regional sub-communities, or user groups based around 
specific competency areas, which further increases the relevance of the community to 
individual partners.  
The communication and knowledge sharing in these partner communities inspires 
confidence, generates a willingness to collaborate for mutual benefit and fosters commitment 
(Matzat, 2004; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Cisco publicizes partner-led solutions in its online 
community and provides rewards for partner-led solutions as community building measures 
(Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). To encourage engagement with the community, contributors to 
Cisco’s community can be awarded VIP status or elected to the Hall of Fame, based on the 
quality of their contribution and influence within the community (Cisco, 2017). Badges and 
awards are also given for those who provide leadership and commitment to their peers. Partners 
who make a significant contribution to the Microsoft Dynamics community (answering 
questions and participating in discussions) are asked to play a moderation role whereby they 
monitor and maintain the quality of the interaction (Microsoft, 2017). These are valued by the 
community as they are seen as independent voices who provide different perspectives. Other 
members of the community recognize community moderators as experts who have been 
promoted in recognition of their passion for the community.  
Via community engagement, the normative influences of the community become 
ingrained, reflected in voluntarism, trust, concern for reputation and reciprocity (Mathwick et 
al., 2008; Capaldo 2014; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). Through the positive reinforcement of shared 
values, and the development of a cohesive social structure within the community, participants’ 
behavior is directly affected (Geyskens et al., 1999; Jones et al., 1997). It for these reasons that 
Grewal et al. (2010) position the establishment of network communities as an important 
informal governance mechanism.  
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Embedded networks  
In examining governance effectiveness, we acknowledge that relationships do not exist 
in a vacuum but rather that they are embedded within a complex network of social, economic 
and hierarchical structures (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). The supplier-partner context positions 
partners as embedded in a network of other partners that have been selected and certified by 
the supplier for whom they are acting as a sales agent. Through the embeddedness perspective 
we are able to consider how partners are effectively coordinated and managed by their supplier 
in order to improve relational performance.   
Following Granovetter (1992) we conceptualise embeddedness at two levels: the 
structural level and the relational level. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) define structural 
embeddedness as the impersonal configuration of linkages between people or units, whilst Choi 
and Kim (2008) assert that structural embeddedness is the framing of partners in relation to the 
network in which they reside. We align with the latter definition as it enables a more rigorous 
examination of the complexity of the context that we are studying – that of large supplier-
partner networks. In the IT sector, we contend that an organization’s performance depends on 
how it environs itself with other companies. In line with Burt’s (1992) structural hole approach, 
this conceptualization of structural embeddedness, also allows us to consider the impact of 
dependency between suppliers and partners in the network and examine the effects of efforts 
made by suppliers to structurally plan the positioning of their network. Structural 
embeddedness can shape the informational and reputational benefits flowing to actors within 
the network, and develop their competitive potential (Kim, 2014). The configuration of the 
partners in a network and the way in which they interact with one another influence the flow 
of resources, status and benefits that accrue between them and their supplier. 
The second type of embeddedness, relational embeddedness, refers to the intensity and 
intimacy of bonds organizations have forged with each other through a history of interactions 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
This article is © Emerald Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/72985/   Emerald does not 
12 
(Granovetter, 1992; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Mutual trust, respect, commitment and a 
sense of obligation shared between actors are the central tenets of relational embeddedness 
(Lawson et al., 2008; Moran, 2005; Rindfleisch and Moorman, 2001). As a form of credible 
assurance for both parties, relational embeddedness offers confidence and reduces the fear of 
opportunism in the exchange process (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Kim, 2014). When two actors are 
relationally embedded, both parties are more trusting and more familiar and will have increased 
opportunity to learn from one another. This informed position will, in turn, increase both actors 
willingness to share information and resources, and cooperate for mutual gain. It follows that 
relational embeddedness improves relationship performance by reducing the expectation of 
opportunistic behavior in the network, helping partners and suppliers to more effectively 
combine knowledge across the network (Kim, 2014). 
Conceptual Model and Hypotheses Development 
We hypothesize that a base model of structural embeddedness – relational 
embeddedness – relationship performance (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Kim, 2014) will 
be affected by the governance mechanisms that partners are subjected to (see Figure 1).  
*** Figure 1 About here *** 
Research has shown the positive impact of structural embeddedness on performance 
(Moran, 2005; Kim, 2014; Zaheer and Bell, 2005). Past studies have also shown that structural 
embeddedness is positively related to relational embeddedness (Li et al., 2014; Zaheer and 
Bell, 2005; Roden and Lawson, 2014). Furthermore, relational embeddedness which manifests 
itself in trustworthiness, promotes cooperative behavior and resource sharing, and partially 
mediates the relationship between partner network structure and relationship performance 
(Carey et al., 2011; Kim, 2014). As these relationships are already established in the literature 
we do not present formal hypotheses, but position these relationships as the base model upon 
which governance operates. We then focus on the moderating effects of certification, a formal 
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approach to governance, and informal governance, embodied in a partner community, on the 
relationship between embeddedness and relational performance. 
Initially, the predominant perspective in governance research was that formal and 
informal governance mechanisms work more effectively as substitutes of each other (e.g. Dyer 
and Singh, 1998; Gulati and Singh, 1998). More recently, this assertion has been challenged 
by the plural form perspective, which contends that both types of governance offer discernible 
benefits when used in conjunction with one another, and should thus be considered 
complementary (Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Li et al., 2010; Yu et al., 2006). However there is 
still a need to investigate the relative substitutive or complementarily effect of alternative 
governance mechanisms, especially across different relationship contexts (Wacker et al., 
2016). In addition, the conceptual development of network governance mechanisms is still in 
the early stages. We argue that the performance of partners can be bolstered by purposefully 
combining certification with the establishment of a partner community. As we now explain, 
partner communities can enhance the usefulness of knowledge generated by certification and 
can offset some of the limitations of certification on relational embeddedness. 
Moderation of the Structural Embeddedness-Relationship Performance Path 
Certification and partner communities can help strengthen the relationship between 
partner network structure and relationship performance by enhancing the flow of both explicit 
and tacit knowledge to the partner. Moreover, the pattern is likely to be similar to that suggested 
by Bell et al. (2009): Certification, as a formal control mechanism, is likely to have a greater 
role in safeguarding the investments that enable the flow of explicit knowledge, whereas the 
partnership community (as informal governance) is more critical to the diffusion of tacit 
knowledge. Thus, their role is complementary. 
With respect to explicit information, the certification process sees suppliers establish 
requirements for partner organizations to achieve a certain level of proficiency or possess a 
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specific knowledge set across their line of products. The standards applied, coupled with the 
formal auditing procedures involved, offer a template for enabling the transfer of explicit 
knowledge across the network (Li et al., 2010) thus strengthening the impact of structural 
embeddedness on relationship performance. Certification allows a supplier to formally increase 
the capabilities of a significant number of partners (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009) and can thus 
raise the effectiveness of the whole network.  
Within the context of supplier-partner networks, online communities have been shown 
to be very effective in providing guidance, relevant information and technical support to 
partners (Graham and Hardaker, 2000). This may be partly due to the fact that these 
communities allow partners to access knowledge that does not reside in their own organization 
but resides within the network as a whole (Anand et al., 2002). Partners in the network have 
overlapping expertise and technological knowledge and therefore will be able to benefit from 
the sharing of information and experiences through partner communities, generating 
economies of expertise in the process (Jones et al., 1997; Spralls et al., 2011) and enabling 
partners to solve problems more efficiently (Bone et al., 2015). Thus partner communities will 
also increase the effectiveness of the partners in the supplier’s network. 
However, we contend that certification and partner communities work to synergistically 
enhance the performance of the network in two ways. First the relative openness and 
informality of partner communities encourages behavioral transparency and trust development 
which enables the free-flow of information and problem solving across the network. 
Complementing this, certification helps partners achieve legitimacy and status (Suchman, 
1995; Graffin and Ward, 2010) by signalling the achievement of a level of knowledge 
(Brunsson et al., 2012). Thus certification reduces information asymmetries between partners 
(King et al., 2005), provides protection against free-riding and enables smoother 
communication flows. Reducing information asymmetry between partners enhances 
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voluntarism and reciprocity in communities (Mathwick et al., 2008). Together certification and 
partner communities set the stage for the smoother generation and flow of knowledge 
enhancing relationship performance.  
Second, partner communities are important for the sharing of tacit knowledge 
enhancing the usefulness of the certified explicit knowledge partners possess. This is because 
a partner community can be a powerful source of information around shared, unspoken rules 
for behavior which strengthen the capabilities of partners. Similar to Jap’s (1999) social 
interaction routines, partner communities provide a forum for partners and suppliers to share 
trouble-shooting tips and hands-on experience (Anand et al., 2002). Even though the 
participating organizations may be direct or indirect competitors, informal and reciprocal 
knowledge exchanges between individuals are valued and sustained over time because the 
sharing of knowledge is an important aspect of being a member of the community (Bouty, 
2000; Mathwick et al., 2008). The community establishes a common language to convey 
complex information and specifies shared tacit rules for behavior (Jones et al., 1997).  
Explicit knowledge exchange is most efficient when community members have similar 
narratives and contextual framing (Wasko and Faraj, 2000). Tacit knowledge enables partners 
to overcome cognitive barriers, and thus assimilate and make full use of explicit knowledge 
(created by the certification process). The partner community also allows partners to address 
any misunderstandings that they may have accrued during its acquisition. It is the interaction 
of tacit and explicit knowledge that is important in creating a higher and richer level of 
knowledge enhancing the usefulness of both (Nonaka, 1994).  
Thus we assert that: 
H1: Governance through certification and partner communities synergistically and 
positively moderate the relationship between partner network structure and 
relationship performance.  
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Moderation of the Structural-Relational-Relationship Performance Path 
The implications of certification and partner communities on the relational aspects of 
the base model are less clear. Research has questioned the value of certification for supplier 
performance (Krause et al., 2007). On one hand, the formalized processes associated with 
certification sets standards and routine procedures for every partner to follow and abide by, 
thus creating less confusion and reducing divergent interpretations of similar activities 
(Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). However, Blonska et al (2013) showed that certification has a 
negative impact on the quality of the relationship. Such a formalized, one-size fits all means of 
governance can aggravate asymmetries in channel perceptions and information flows, causing 
resentment and actually reducing coordination (Gilliland et al., 2010). This points to a darker 
side of certification where it may be perceived by some as a coercive influence attempt. 
Coercive influence mechanisms apply direct pressure by communicating the possible negative 
consequences of non-compliance to encourage specific behaviors (Frazier and Rody, 1991).  
Certification, whilst it may confer positive informational benefits, can be viewed as a 
form of unilateral control, in favour of the supplier, limiting partner autonomy and increasing 
conflict, often leading to defensive or opportunistic behavior (Brown et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
the monitoring aspect of certification may signal supplier distrust and lack of confidence in the 
partners’ attributes (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), impeding cooperative behavior (Huang et al., 
2014). These factors may mean that certification can destabilize the relationship suggesting a 
limit to the impact of certification on relationship embeddedness and performance. 
Conversely, an effective partner community increases the perception of transparency 
and fosters positive perceptions of fairness in suppliers’ network management practices. As a 
governance mechanism, it is targeted towards increasing total value rather than share of value 
(Burkert et al., 2012). The community provides the opportunity and motivation to strengthen 
the interactions, through improved communication and understanding of the other partners in 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
This article is © Emerald Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/72985/   Emerald does not 
17 
the network (Yu et al., 2006). Relational embeddedness is tightly linked with the norm of 
helping each other on online networks (Matzat, 2004). Even the sole act of sharing information 
in online communities increases relationship commitment (Weber, 2001). Still, the social 
support available through these communities has an even more significant effect on 
commitment (Mathwick et al., 2008). The community creates a convergence of expectations 
through socialization (Jones et al., 1997). When collaborations are ingrained in a cohesive 
social partner community, the partners’ concern for reputation within the community, acts as a 
governance mechanism (Capaldo, 2014). The community supports embedded social 
relationships that help mitigate the risks associated with opportunistic behavior (Grewal et al., 
2017). This not only strengthens existing relational embeddedness but can also directly 
improve the knowledge benefits of collaboration, as well as performance more broadly (Wasko 
and Faraj, 2000). 
However, the benefits of certification and partner communities on the relationship can 
be further understood by considering their synergistic effects. Whilst evidence has shown that 
simultaneously investing in relational ties between actors, and imposing evaluation and 
certification expectations, creates ambiguity and a disconnect in the relationship (Wagner, 
2010), we suggest that the socialization, information transparency, knowledge sharing and 
troubleshooting opportunities offered in partner communities, offset potential adverse reactions 
to certification (such as perceptions of lock-in, control and monitoring).  
Partner communities elevate the efficiency of certification through the sense of 
“community” created while at the same time countering perceptual consequences of the 
monitoring efforts of the supplier (Bell et al., 2009). In this way, we contend that partner 
communities operate as a type of social control which buffer against, and neutralize, a partner's 
potentially negative sentiments and adverse reactions to the certification process (Brown et al., 
2016). The relationships fostered in these communities encourage social cohesion, with the 
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ongoing interaction serving to support and reinforce norms of behavior, which effectively act 
as a self-enforcing safeguard (Heide, 1994). Supporting this, Osmonbekov et al. (2016) found 
that formal governance in the form of contracts exasperates a partner’s perceived inequity 
whereas social enforcement, captured as norms of behavior, reduces it. 
At the same time certification can support the effectiveness of the partner community. 
Certification allows for a specific form of trust to develop in the online partner communities; 
the trust of belonging to the same organizational network (Grabner-Krauter, 2009). Spralls et 
al. (2011) found the degree to which partners have confidence in the reliability and integrity of 
other network partners a key element of an online community’s ability to build closer 
relationships with partners. Similarly, Markus and Agre (2000) state that for virtual 
organizations in the open-source context, “a large ‘community of practice’ with a strong, shared 
technical professionalism” is needed. Certification, by definition, is the affirmation of such 
technical professionalism which reinforces partners’ commitment to the community enhancing 
its effectiveness. Thus, while certification on its own may have a dark side, when used in 
conjunction of a partner community, it will strengthen the benefits of the latter.  
We hypothesize: 
H2: Certification and partner community governance synergistically and positively 
moderates the relationships between, (a) partner network structure and relationship 
embeddedness, and (b) relationship embeddedness and relationship performance. 
Methodology 
Measures 
To test the conceptual model a survey was carried out. Where possible, scales from 
previous research were used and adapted to the specific context. The scales for the two 
governance mechanisms were developed specifically for this research. Items for the scales were 
based on the literature reviewed. Exploratory interviews, lasting 60-90 minutes, were 
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conducted with a group of 11 senior managers from a mixture of supplier and partner firms. 
All practitioners were experts with considerable experience in managing the affairs of partner 
organizations for at least two years in this field. Their feedback helped us revise the 
questionnaire, shape the conceptual model and purify the items. Their interpretation of the 
items in the measures helped ensure the content and face validity of each measure. The final 
questionnaire was pretested with a holdout sample of 31 managers from partner firms which 
helped further purify the measures and indicated that the items in the final survey instrument 
were reliable and valid (Gilliland and Bello, 2002). All scale items were assessed on 7-point 
Likert scales (see the appendix for a complete list of measures).  
Certification governance was based on the existing research on certification (Blonska 
et al., 2013; Krause et al., 2007; Modi and Mabert, 2007) and refined via interviews with 
managers. This scale was assessed on four items: our supplier requires us to have substantial 
resources (i.e capital, number of employees) in place before being granted certified status; 
requires our employees to demonstrate a high level of knowledge (e.g via examinations, test, 
qualifications etc.) before being certified; requires our employees to undertake specified 
training; our supplier regularly reviews our certification status.2 The scale reflects the elements 
commonly associated with certification programmes in the IT sector, a resource or capability 
requirement; a training requirement; a formalized process of assessment, and a monitoring 
programme (Gilliland, 2003; Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). 
Partner community governance refers to the totality of effort exerted by the supplier to 
create an online community of practice which allows partners to interact, collaborate on 
problem solving, exchange knowledge and expertise, and form cooperative connections 
                                                 
2 One item - certification level is a key influence amongst customers in our market - was 
removed after feedback from managers. This were not deemed to be part of the governance 
aspects of certification. 
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(Graham and Hardaker et al., 2000; Mathwick et al. 2008; Wasko and Faraj, 2005). This scale 
was based on the scale for online community building from Grewal et al. (2010) and interviews 
with managers which stressed the importance of online communities for information sharing 
and for discussions between peers for troubleshooting. Partner community governance was 
measured using four items that assessed the extent to which partners were encouraged to 
interact and share information amongst each other; the existence of discussion forums to enable 
information sharing; the value partners place on discussions with other partners, and the belief 
that partners were cooperative rather than competitive.3 
Relationship performance is defined as a channel member’s evaluation of the economic 
outcomes that flow from the relationship with its partner (Geyskens et al., 1999). Relationship 
performance was measured using a three item scale developed by Nyaga et al. (2010).  
Relationship embeddedness, which reflects the closeness of bonds between the partner 
and their supplier, was captured using a four-item scale from Rindfleisch and Moorman (2001).  
Partner network structure is the extent to which a partner feels it is deeply and fairly 
embedded in a network of partners. Building on the work of Anderson and Weitz (1992), 
partner network structure was measured by 4 items that assess partner’s perception of their 
supplier’s effectiveness in planning and managing its network of partners, designating their 
territories and avoiding direct competition between partners. 
In addition, a number of variables that may influence relationship performance were 
included in the tested models. The tier level of the partner was measured on a 3-point scale 
(entry/foundation-, mid-, and top-tier level partners) as this often determines the level of 
support a partner receives (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009). Partners were asked to indicate if the 
proportion of their total revenues’ from the specified supplier was greater or less than 50% as 
                                                 
3 One item - there is good sense of shared belonging amongst the partners of our supplier – 
was dropped after the pre-test. 
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a measure of the partner’s dependency on the supplier which may affect business to business 
relationships (Gilliland and Bello, 2002). The length of the relationship and the size of the 
partner organization (measured using number of employees) were also controlled for as these 
can affect embeddedness and relationship performance (Kim, 2014; Poppo and Zhou, 2014). 
The type of product (hardware versus software) was also controlled as the relative importance 
of certification and online communities of practice may increase with more information intense 
products (Spralls et al., 2011). 
Sampling 
The empirical part of this study was carried out via a key informant survey. Partners 
were identified from websites of leading IT companies4. Data was collected from the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. Partner directories on the IT firm’s websites were used to identify 
appropriate partners and contact information. Where possible, direct contact with firms was 
made to check the identity of the most appropriate informant. Informants needed to have had 
experience with the supplier for at least one year and be in a position whereby they dealt with 
the supplier organization directly. In the cases in which such a key informant was not 
identifiable, the firm was excluded from the sample. 720 certified partners were identified. The 
final questionnaire was pretested with a holdout sample of 31 managers from partner firms. To 
gauge the ability of the informants to report on the variables of interest, follow-up interviews 
of informants were conducted. These interviews verified that the approach taken was able to 
identify suitably knowledgeable informants (Gilliland and Bello, 2002). The interviews were 
used to ascertain key informants’ interpretation of the items in the measures, to ensure content 
validity of each measure and construct equivalence.  
                                                 
4 The Forbes2000 list of top 2000 ranking public companies was used to identify leading IT 
companies (www.Forbes.com). The ranking is based on a mix of four metrics: sales, profit, 
assets and market value. Firms were excluded if they were found not to employ certified 
partners.  
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
This article is © Emerald Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/72985/   Emerald does not 
22 
In total 151 complete responses were received, representing a response rate of 21%. 
The average length of experience with the supplier was 3 years. 41% of the partners had been 
in a relationship with their supplier for more than five years. Out of the completed surveys, 
61% of the partners had less than 100 employees and 21% had between 100 and 500 employees. 
To assess non-response bias, early and late respondents were compared (Armstrong and 
Overton, 1977). The results of t-tests revealed that there is no significant difference on the 
constructs, or on demographic variables such as number of employees between the two groups 
indicating that non-response bias does not pose a significant problem for our research. 
Analysis 
Analysis and assessment of the psychometric properties of the measurement model 
followed procedures commonly employed in the literature. Exploratory factor analysis was 
conducted on all manifest variables to provide evidence of discriminant validity. The analysis 
provided a correctly loading solution. Harman's single factor test was used to assess common 
method bias. The factor accounted for less than half of the total variance (38% of 77%). To 
further validate the measurement model confirmatory factor analysis using AMOS 23.0 was 
undertaken. For a 5-factor model the model fit indices are χ2 = 204.6, χ2/df = 1.64, CFI = 0.95, 
RMSEA = 0.06 which suggests the measurement model is acceptable (Hair et al., 2014).  
Following Sumo et al. (2016) PLS-SEM was employed rather than covariance-based 
modelling (CB-SEM) due to the complexity of our model. The inclusion of 2-way and 3-way 
interaction terms increases the complexity of the model. When there are a large number of 
items per latent variable, as in the case of product indicator interaction terms, CB-SEM 
increases the total number of parameter estimates, possibly leading to model identification and 
convergence issues (Peng and Lai, 2012). Compared to CB-SEM techniques, model 
complexity does not pose a severe restriction because PLS modelling only estimates a subset 
of parameters at any moment (Wetzels et al., 2009). This leads to a successful estimate of the 
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factor loadings and structural paths for each individual subset and PLS-SEM is suggested as a 
valid alternative to CB-SEM (Peng and Lai, 2012; Reinartz et al., 2009). PLS thus readily 
accommodates complex relationships in the structural model and it does so effectively with a 
relatively small sample size in comparison to CB-SEM (Sarstedt et al., 2016). In addition, the 
model included a number of single-item control variables, which PLS-SEM (but not CB-SEM) 
would process without identification problems (Hair et al., 2014). 
Coefficient α and composite reliability were calculated for each construct in the 
measurement model and were found to be greater than the recommended minimum of 0.6 for 
the first two measures, indicating acceptable reliability (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2014). Average 
variance extracted (AVE) for all latent variables was found to be above the minimum of 0.5. 
The standardized loadings from the PLS-SEM model were acceptable providing evidence of 
convergent and discriminant validity (Chin, 1998). Discriminant validity was also assessed by 
examining whether each construct shared more variance with its measures than with other 
constructs in the model (Chin, 1998). To this end, AVE was always greater than the highest 
shared variance with the other factors, indicating discriminant validity. The results demonstrate 
the reliability and validity of the measurement model. Correlations between all latent variables 
are shown in Table 1 and the loadings are shown in the Appendix.  
*** Table 1 About Here *** 
The results for the hypothesized structural model are shown in Table 2. A hierarchical 
approach to variable inclusion was followed where first a direct effects model was tested 
(Model 1). This was the base model. Next, the two-way interactions between all relevant 
variables were added to create model 2. Last, this was followed by the insertion of the 3-way 
interactions to create model 3. To test for the interaction effects in the model, interaction terms 
were developed using an orthogonalizing residual product indicator approach as follows: First, 
product terms were created between all indicators of the relevant constructs. Second, the 
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product terms were regressed on all the indicators and third, the residuals were used as 
indicators of the interaction term (Henseler and Chin, 2010). This limits multicollinearity 
amongst the interaction terms. Checks revealed that the variance inflation factors of the latent 
variables in the structural model are less than 2, suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue 
in this data (Hair et al., 2014).  
*** Table 2 About Here *** 
To assess the quality of the model, a goodness-of-fit (GOF) measure 
(�average R2 ∗ average AVE) was calculated. Assuming a large effect size for R2 (0.26) and 
a cut-off value of AVE of 0.70, a comparison GOF value is 0.42 (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). The 
goodness of fit calculated was 0.55, indicating a good fit. In addition, Q2 was calculated for the 
outcome variables to assess predictive validity. This was 0.22 for relationship embeddedness 
and 0.42 for relationship performance. The fact that both of these were above zero indicates 
that the model has predictive relevance (Tenenhaus et al., 2005). 
Results 
According to the results in Table 2, partner network structure has a direct effect on 
relationship performance (β = 0.27)5. Partner network structure also has a strong positive 
impact on relationship embeddedness (β = 0.36), which in turn impacts relationship 
performance (β = 0.34). Together these show that relationship embeddedness partially mediates 
the relationship between partner network structure and relationship performance supporting the 
base model6. Partners embedded in a planned network structure accrue performance benefits 
                                                 
5 Research advocates the use of one-tailed test when testing directional and theory driven 
hypothesis (Cho and Abe, 2013; Phang et al. 2014). Therefore the 3-way interactions are tested 
using 1-tailed tests, else 2-tailed tests are employed. 
6 A Sobel test demonstrated the significance of mediation (t = 2.94, p < 0.00). When, we tested 
a model without the mediator, the relationship between partner network structure and 
relationship performance was substantially larger (β=0.41). 
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both directly and through the trust, integrity and cooperation afforded to them through 
relational embeddedness.   
When we compare the 2-way interaction model (M2) to the direct model (M1): 
including the interaction terms, relationship embeddedness R2 increases from 0.25 to 0.36 (∆R2 
= 0.12, p < 0.00). The f2 of the interaction term is 0.17 suggesting a medium effect size (Chin 
et al., 2003; Cohen 1988). Similarly, for relationship performance, the increase in R2 (∆R2 = 
0.05, p = 0.01; f2 = 0.13) is significant with a medium effect.  
Similarly, the R2 for relationship embeddedness increases from 0.36 in a 2-way 
interaction model (M2) to 0.38 in a 3-way interaction model – M3 (∆R2 = 0.02, p = 0.03). The 
effect size (f2) of the interaction term is 0.03 suggesting a small effect. The increase in R2 for 
relationship performance (∆R2 = 0.03, p < 0.01; f2 = 0.08) is significant with a small to medium 
effect. These results provide support for the plural view of governance.  
Significant interaction effects are also graphed in Figures 2 and 3. We followed a 
method prevalent in the literature (Aiken and West, 1991; Dawson, 2014). We used one 
standard deviation above and below the mean to capture high and low levels. When partner 
community governance is in place, certification can enhance the impact of partner network 
structure on relationship performance (β = 0.17), and vice-versa. This supports H1. However 
the results are starker. Both certification and partner community governance reduce the 
effectiveness of a partner network structure in driving relationship performance without the 
support of the other governance mechanism (Figure 2). It is the interplay of both certification 
and partner communities that lead to performance enhancements. 
*** Figures 2 & 3 About here *** 
The impact on the network structure – relationship embeddedness relationship is less 
straightforward. The significant three-way interaction (β = 0.14) supports H2a. Without 
certification, partner community has a limited effect on the extent to which partner network 
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structure drives relationship embeddedness (Figure 3). Certification enhances the usefulness of 
a partner community. However the effects of partner communities go even further. 
Certification without partner communities has a negative effect on the network structure – 
relationship embeddedness relationship. The introduction of partner community governance 
can remove this detrimental effect. 
However the 3-way interaction between relationship embeddedness, certification and 
partner community on relationship performance is not significant (β = -0.10, n.s.) thus failing 
to provide support for H2b.  
Further understanding of the impact of certification and partner community can be 
uncovered by looking at the 2-way interaction model (M2). On its own certification governance 
did not enhance the impact of structural embeddedness on relationship performance. 
Certification failed to moderate the relationship between partner network structure and 
relationship performance (β = -0.06, n.s.). The darker side of certification is evidenced by the 
negative moderation of the relationships between partner network structure and relationship 
embeddedness (β = -0.29); and between relationship embeddedness and relationship 
performance (β = -0.16). This suggests that the procedural effects of certification are not that 
pronounced and that the relationship effects are rather detrimental. 
Conversely, partner community fails to moderate the relationship between network 
structure and relationship performance (β = -0.08, n.s.). In contrast to certification governance, 
under partner community governance the network structure – relationship embeddedness – 
relationship performance relationship is strengthened. Partner community governance 
positively moderates the relationships between partner network structure and relationship 
embeddedness (β = 0.27); and between relationship embeddedness and relationship 
performance (β = 0.13). These results demonstrate the significant relational effects of partner 
communities. It is through this that relationship performance is enhanced.  
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
This article is © Emerald Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/72985/   Emerald does not 
27 
Discussion and Implications 
Motivated by IT suppliers, such as Microsoft and Oracle’s, struggle to manage their 
partner networks effectively, we set out to investigate the effects of two network governance 
mechanisms - namely certification and partner communities - on the link between 
embeddedness and relationship performance. 
With respect to our first hypothesis, we find strong support for the plural form of 
governance. In order to attain maximum benefits from their partners, suppliers should use both 
formal and informal governance mechanisms (i.e. certification and partner communities), to 
support their network. Suppliers in the IT sector faced with network overload as a result of 
attempting to control a dispersed network of tens of thousands of partners have introduced two 
mechanism to maximise the performance of their partners. Suppliers certify their partners and 
provide communities of practice to support them. The governance of partners is a crucial issue 
in the IT sector, as suppliers have to adopt a broad overview of their entire structural network. 
It is not only the capabilities of the partners, but also their position in the market that determines 
performance. In addition, these partners are the final link between the suppliers and the 
consumers, putting them in a critical position. Thus, effective governance is critical in 
achieving desired results. 
The synergistic benefits of deploying both certification and partner communities, we 
contend, can be attributed to the interplay between the explicit knowledge shared via the 
certification process (Kalyanam and Brar, 2009), and the tacit experiences shared in partner 
communities (Anand et al., 2002). This tacit knowledge provides a narrative and contextual 
framing that enables partners to overcome cognitive barriers, assimilate and make full use of 
explicit knowledge. At the same time, certification reduces information asymmetry between 
partners (King et al., 2005) which reduces free-riding, enhances voluntarism and reciprocity, 
thus increasing the likelihood of sharing tacit knowledge in the community (Mathwick et al., 
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2008). Thus together partner communities and certification enhance the relationship between 
structural embeddedness and relational performance.  
We report support for the argument that certification and partner communities jointly 
and positively moderate the relationship between partner network structure and relational 
embeddedness (H2a). This suggests that certification and partner communities elevate each 
other’s benefits and helps develop a stronger bond between partners and their supplier. On one 
hand, partner communities complement certifications by creating a sense of community while 
countering the sense of monitoring created by certifications (Bell et al., 2009). Certification 
can increase conflict and increase relationship-damaging behavior (Brown et al., 2009). Yet, 
partner communities develop a sense of fairness and commitment (Weber, 2001), operating as 
a social control buffering against, and neutralizing, a partner's potentially negative sentiments 
and adverse reactions to the certification process. Furthermore, certifications signal that the 
partners belonging to the network have similar baseline capabilities. The signal that the partners 
‘belong to the same club’ increases their credibility thus supporting the relationship-building 
in partner communities (Grabner-Krauter, 2009; Markus and Agres, 2000). Together, they help 
suppliers to improve the relational embeddedness of the partner network structure. These 
results may partially be driven by characteristics of the IT sector: certification is most common 
in this sector and unlike those, such as ISO 9000, used in other sectors, it is applied to all 
partners. In addition, partner communities are very prevalent in IT industries. The long history 
of these communities in this sector and the repeated experiences of the partners with them, is 
possibly helping partners recognize their informational and relational benefits.  
We find that certification and partner communities do not have an interactive effect on 
the performance implications of relational embeddedness. Evidenced by the non-significant 
results for hypothesis 2b. It may be that certification diminishes the positive effects, such as 
perceptions of transparency and fairness, generated by partner communities (Yu et al. 2006). 
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The monitoring and oversight elements of certification could be viewed as a violation of the 
social norms, trust and integrity embodied in relational embeddedness. An alternative 
explanation may be that relationships which are considered to be closely bound do not benefit 
as expected from certification, and the socialization embodied in partner communities, is not 
enough to offset the negative perceptions of this auditory, evaluative process.  
Greater insight into the role of certification and partner communities may be gained by 
drilling down to the 2-way interactions. The results show that certification and partner 
communities work in opposite directions when it comes to the relational aspects of partner 
networks. We find support for the dark side of certifications, whereby, if used in isolation, they 
may represent a coercive tool that weakens the fabric of interorganizational relationships 
(Gilliland et al., 2010). The results show that certification negatively moderates both the 
relationship between structural embeddedness and relational embeddedness and that of the 
latter with relationship performance (see Model 2, Table 2). This result can be compared to 
previous studies that report that the more a relationship is formally monitored, the more 
opportunistically the monitored party is likely to act (Brown et al., 2016). Similarly, formalized 
governance structures (such as certification) have been linked to the withholding or distortion 
of information (Koza and Dant, 2007). This helps to explain why certification, if used in 
isolation, undermines the effort that has went into planning a network of partners and degrades 
the relational ties that bind them. 
Extant research has shown that through ongoing community engagement, the normative 
influences of the community become ingrained leading to commitment to the community 
(Mathwick et al., 2008). We find support for this view and show that a partner community 
positively moderates the relationship between structural embeddedness and relational 
embeddedness; and between relational embeddedness and relationship performance (see 
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Model 2, Table 2). Such communities create the environment for sharing tacit information by 
establishing a common language and rules of behavior (Jones et al., 1997).  
In this study, we make a number of contributions to theory. First, our results support 
earlier research that suggested that the link between structural embeddedness and relationship 
performance is (partially) mediated by relational embeddedness (Carey et al. 2011; Kim, 2014). 
This is still a relevant finding to report given the nuances of this context and our unit of analysis. 
Embeddedness takes a unique form in our IT context, given the key role of the supplier in 
managing the positioning of partners within the structural network so that they complement, 
rather than cannibalize each other (Morris et al., 2006; Provan and Kenis, 2008). What we can 
infer from our results is that the support and structure offered through a well-planned partner 
network positively influences partner performance. This relationship works in part, through the 
history of interactions, shared sense of obligation, respect and commitment between partners. 
In other words, relational embeddedness acts a glue binding the actors in these complex 
networks, comprised of many partners. We also recognize that the link between the different 
types of embeddedness and performance needs to be considered in relation to significant 
contingencies, one of which are the governance mechanisms organizations employ to manage 
their relationships (Rowley et al., 2000).  
Our second contribution relates to the governance of large-scale networks, prevalent in 
the IT sector, rather than individual dyads, as per much of the literature to date. Managing these 
networks needs more than a straightforward extrapolation of practices used to manage dyadic 
relationships. Our choice of network governance mechanisms also reflects the sectoral 
uniqueness of the IT context. This addresses the need for a more granular understanding of the 
relative contribution, and limitations, of different network governance mechanisms. Although 
certifications are heavily used as a way of influencing the partners in complex IT networks, 
prior research on their use as a governance mechanism is limited. Similarly, whilst increasing 
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attention is being placed on the impact of online communities as value adding social 
mechanisms in supplier-customer exchanges (Bone et al., 2015), the role of partner 
communities as a network governance mechanism has not been explored to date. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our results contribute to the plural form debate 
in governance research. The plural form perspective primarily rests on the supposition that 
formal and informal governance mechanisms work in different ways and have different 
benefits, procedural or relational, respectively. Thus they can be used in tandem. We extend 
previous studies on the plural form view by considering both the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ of 
governance mechanisms, specifically certification, and investigating how the use of formal and 
informal mechanisms as complements play out when considering both the negative and the 
positive. What we find is that they should be used in tandem: certification and partner 
communities, elevate each other’s strengths thus allowing suppliers leverage their partner 
networks to add value.  
The results show that managers need to reflect carefully on their approach to governing 
partner relationships as some mechanisms, such as certification, can have unfavourable 
consequences. In addition, managers should consider how they might integrate online forums 
and message boards to support their partners. These communities are not only an effective 
medium for the sharing of tacit information which is traditionally difficult to codify and control, 
but they also serve as a supporting mechanism for the more formal components of these 
relationships, such as certifications, which can often be met with hesitancy and suspicion.  
Limitations and further research 
This study generates important insights into the governance of a large network of 
partners. We elaborate on the use of certifications in networks as a formal governance 
mechanism and introduce partner communities as an informal mechanism. Our data was 
derived from a cross-sectional survey. Yet, partner networks are social collectives that are 
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dynamic and develop over time. Longitudinal research designs should be used in future 
research to track how different partner segments (e.g., newcomers vs. experienced partners) 
develop over time so we can better understand the impact of different governance mechanisms 
in the light of different relationship trajectories (Poppo and Zenger, 2002).   
Our study was conducted in the IT sector, which is a channel environment in which the 
service orientation and the importance of interpersonal relationships lead to the development 
of informal social structures, such as partner communities (Vandaele et al., 2007). This sector 
encompasses suppliers of both hardware and software products. Whilst we controlled for this 
difference, further research could explore the relative importance of certification and partner 
communities based on the type of IT supplier. Furthermore, certain idiosyncrasies pertaining 
to the setting of our research may limit the generalizability of our findings. The type of 
certification we examined, which was focused on training and competencies, rather than 
process development (prevalent in the certification of suppliers). Additional research may 
consider adopting a broader view of certification type, and also acknowledge that certification 
can be managed by third party organizations independent of the parties involved in the 
relationship.  
Our data was collected from network partners which we believe to be entirely 
appropriate, given the research context (where large IT suppliers employ certification and 
partner communities to manage a large number of dispersed small to medium sized partners). 
In this context, partners are required to abide by the supplier’s rules and it is therefore important 
for suppliers to understand the relationship implications of their decisions. Yet, given that the 
supplier has a significant role in setting the network structure, enforcing certification and 
establishing communities, understanding their perspective is important for the advancement of 
network governance research.  
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Appendix. Items, Loadings, Scales, Reliability and Validity 
 
Relationship Performance (CR = 0.94, α = 0.90, AVE = 0.83, HSV= 0.41) 1 
Our business relationship with this supplier is very profitable. 2 
Due to our business relationship with this supplier, our company 
has gained a significant share of the market 
Due to our business relationship with this supplier, our company 
has been able to attract significant numbers of new customers 
0.86 
0.94 
 
0.93 
0.51 
0.59 
 
0.58 
 
0.49 
0.49 
 
0.50 
 
0.24 
0.36 
 
0.37 
 
0.31 
0.42 
 
0.46 
 
Relationship Embeddedness(CR = 0.96, α = 0.94, AVE = 0.90, HSV= 0.41)  
We have a close personal relationship with our supplier 
We have complete trust in our supplier 
There is a great deal of mutual empathy and respect between our 
supplier and ourselves 
We expect a long-lasting relationship with our supplier 3 
0.52 
0.59 
0.59 
 
0.94 
0.94 
0.96 
0.37 
0.49 
0.47 
 
0.29 
0.25 
0.25 
 
0.34 
0.33 
0.37 
 
Partner Network Structure (CR = 0.90, α = 0.85, AVE = 0.69, HSV= 0.29)  
The way in which this supplier manages its network of partners is 
very effective 
The supplier has a very well planned network of partners 
In our business relationship with this supplier, we have a well 
designated market or sales territory 
Our supplier manages its network of partners to avoid them 
directly competing with each other 
0.42 
 
0.44 
0.43 
 
0.39 
 
0.38 
 
0.42 
0.44 
 
0.30 
 
0.86 
 
0.87 
0.83 
 
0.77 
0.22 
 
0.25 
0.36 
 
0.20 
 
0.44 
 
0.45 
0.47 
 
0.43 
 
Certification Governance (CR = 0.89, α = 0.84, AVE = 0.67, HSV= 0.12)  
Our supplier requires us to have substantial resources (i.e 
capital, number of employees) in place before being granted 
certified status 
Our supplier requires our employees to demonstrate a high level 
of knowledge (e.g via examinations, test, qualifications etc) 
before being certified 
In order to be certified, our supplier requires our employees to 
undertake specified training 
Our supplier regularly reviews our certification status 
0.26 
 
 
0.30 
 
 
0.25 
 
0.34 
0.19 
 
 
0.23 
 
 
0.18 
 
0.28 
0.18 
 
 
0.25 
 
 
0.23 
 
0.34 
0.76 
 
 
0.89 
 
 
0.83 
 
0.80 
0.13 
 
 
0.29 
 
 
0.21 
 
0.43 
Partner Community (CR = 0.89, α = 0.83, AVE = 0.66, HSV= 0.29) 
Our supplier encourages us to interact and share information with 
other partners of our supplier 
Our supplier provides useful forums (e.g message boards, chat 
rooms, webinar etc) for discussions between the partners of the 
supplier and between the partners and the supplier 
Discussions with other partners are valuable in helping us solve 
technical problems 
Our relationship with other partners of our suppliers is one of co-
operation rather than competition. 
0.37 
 
0.31 
 
 
0.39 
 
0.36 
 
0.36 
 
0.26 
 
 
0.26 
 
0.29 
 
0.48 
 
0.46 
 
 
0.40 
 
0.42 
 
0.35 
 
0.36 
 
 
0.26 
 
0.15 
 
0.87 
 
0.79 
 
 
0.78 
 
0.83 
1α = Scale reliability coefficient; CR – Composite reliability; AVE – Average variance extracted; HSV – 
Highest shared variance. 
2All items measured on Likert scale – (1) strongly disagree, (7) strongly agree. 
3Item removed during analysis. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Model  
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 Relationship Performance A B C D E F G H 
 A. Relationship 
Embeddedness 0.63* -      
  
 B. Partner Network Structure 0.54* 0.46* -       
 C. Certification Governance 0.36* 0.28* 0.32* -      
 D. Partner Community Gov. 0.44* 0.37* 0.54* 0.34* -     
 E. Relationship Length 0.17+ 0.13 -0.08 0.16+ 0.03 -    
 F. Tier Level -0.35* -0.40* -0.09 -0.24* -0.13 -0.46* -   
 G. Firm Size 0.22* 0.21* 0.08 0.26* 0.01 0.32* -0.41* -  
 H. Supplier dependency 0.32* 0.27* 0.08 0.27* 0.20* 0.28* 0.27* -0.04 - 
 I. Product (hardware) -0.11 -0.15+ -0.10 0.24* 0.09 0.12 -0.09 -0.04 0.22* 
Mean (s.d.)  4.11 (1.37) 
4.54 
(1.74) 
4.01 
(1.27) 
5.04 
(1.28) 
3.70 
(1.27) - 
  
- 
+significant at 5% level, *significant at 1% level (2-tailed). 
Table 1. Latent Variable Correlations 
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Table 2. PLS Results 
Path Model 11 Model 2 Model 3 
Direct effects model    
Partner Network Structure → Relationship Performance 0.27 (3.62)* 0.23 (3.16)* 0.24 (3.19)* 
Partner Network Structure → Relationship Embeddedness 0.36 (3.60)* 0.34 (3.93)* 0.34 (3.77)* 
Relationship Embeddedness → Relationship Performance 0.34 (3.78)* 0.33 (4.18)* 0.33 (3.98)* 
Relationship Length → Relationship Performance 0.05 (1.14) 0.04 (1.06) 0.04 (0.91) 
Tier Level → Relationship Performance -0.09 (1.44) -0.10 (1.58) -0.11 (1.78) 
Firm Size → Relationship Performance 0.04 (0.75) 0.02 (0.44) 0.02 (0.48) 
Supplier dependency → Relationship Performance 0.13 (1.86) 0.08 (1.56) 0.06 (1.11) 
Product (Hardware) → Relationship Performance -0.10 (1.71) -0.10 (1.80) -0.09 (1.80) 
Certification Governance → Relationship Embeddedness 0.12 (1.54) 0.15 (2.10)* 0.13 (2.18)* 
Partner Community → Relationship Embeddedness 0.13 (1.45) 0.11 (1.40) 0.11 (1.40) 
Certification Governance → Relationship Performance 0.09 (1.42) 0.10 (1.85) 0.10 (1.79) 
Partner Community → Relationship Performance 0.11 (1.48) 0.14 (1.80) 0.14 (1.74) 
2-way interactions    
Network Structure x Certification Governance   → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
 -0.29 (2.64)* 
-0.06 (0.83) 
-0.29 (2.71)* 
-0.06 (1.01) 
Relationship Embeddedness x Certification Governance→ Relationship Performance  -0.16 (1.99)* -0.12 (1.54) 
Network Structure x Partner Community  → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
 0.27 (2.74)* 
-0.08 (1.34) 
0.27 (2.40)* 
-0.07 (1.13) 
Relationship Embeddedness x Partner Community → Relationship Performance  0.13 (1.96)* 0.09 (1.38) 
Certification Governance x Partner Community  → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
 0.15 (1.85) 
0.08 (1.24) 
0.15 (2.02)* 
0.09 (1.64) 
3-way interactions    
Network Structure x Certification x Partner Community → Relationship Embeddedness 
       → Relationship Performance 
  0.14 (1.89) *a 
0.17 (1.99) *a 
Relationship Embeddedness    → Relationship Performance 
   x Certification x Partner Community  
  -0.10 (1.16) 
Variance explained:  Relationship Embeddedness  R2 
        F change 
   Relationship Performance  R2 
        F change 
0.25 
 
0.54 
 
0.36 
8.25 (0.00) 
0.59 
3.41 (0.01) 
0.38 
4.61 (.03) 
0.62 
 5.45 (0.01) 
 
1. Path Coef. (t-value); * Path significant at p < 0.05 (2-tailed); *a Path significant at p < 0.05 (1-tailed) 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
This article is © Emerald Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/72985/   Emerald does not 
45 
 
            (-1 s.d.) (standardized) (+1 s.d.) 
 
 
            (-1 s.d.) (standardized) (+1 s.d.) 
 
Figure 2. 3-Way Interaction on Relationship Performance 
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             (-1 s.d.)   (standardized)     (+1 s.d.) 
 
 
            (-1 s.d.)   (standardized)  (+1 s.d.) 
 
Figure 3. 3-Way Interaction on Relationship Embeddedness 
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Low Partner Network
Structure
High Partner Network
Structure
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
Em
be
dd
ed
ne
ss
(s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d)
High Partner Community (+1 s.d.)
High Certification
LowCertification
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
Low Partner Network
Structure
High Partner Network
Structure
R
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
Em
be
dd
ed
ne
ss
(s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d)
Low Partner Community (-1 s.d.)
High Certification
Low Certification
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
